Hope Is Not A Plan: War In Iraq From Inside The Green Zone
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Description:
By summer 2004, it was clear that the war in Iraq was not going to be over quickly. What westerners call the insurgency was not merely 'dead-enders,' bent on restoring the old regime, but a complex mix of Ba'athists, Sunni fundamentalists, Shi'a rejectionists, foreign infiltrators, and patriotic Iraqi nationalists who resented the occupation. The war also faced growing public ...
By summer 2004, it was clear that the war in Iraq was not going to be over quickly. What westerners call the insurgency was not merely 'dead-enders,' bent on restoring the old regime, but a complex mix of Ba'athists, Sunni fundamentalists, Shi'a rejectionists, foreign infiltrators, and patriotic Iraqi nationalists who resented the occupation. The war also faced growing public ...
Description:
By summer 2004, it was clear that the war in Iraq was not going to be over quickly. What westerners call the insurgency was not merely 'dead-enders,' bent on restoring the old regime, but a complex mix of Ba'athists, Sunni fundamentalists, Shi'a rejectionists, foreign infiltrators, and patriotic Iraqi nationalists who resented the occupation. The war also faced growing public discontent within all the coalition countries themselves. Finally, it faced poor coordination and communication among the American agencies responsible for Iraq's transition from an occupied country to one with a constitutional government. The war was directed from Washington and executed by troops on the ground throughout Iraq; between those levels was the Green Zone, home to the U.S. embassy and the agencies established to oversee a transition to Iraqi rule. Hope is Not a Plan takes the reader inside the Green Zone. It looks at an aspect of the war not previously examined. This is not the story as seen from Washington, not that of the soldier on the ground. It looks at the process of turning political and military goals into action. It focuses on the critical months of late 2004 and early 2005 when a new sovereign government in Iraq tried to build its legitimacy and the coalition force tried to find the best way to help it do so. In doing so, it helps explain how Iraq got to where it is today. The book is organised by topic rather than on a strict chronological basis. It is practical, not theoretical, referring to lessons learned. The book describes what happened in the Green Zone during this period, and it contrasts that reality with what history, experience, and military doctrine suggests should have happened, describing the impact of these mistakes. Finally, it reflects on what we can learn from this experience so that it is not repeated.
Author Biography:
Thomas Mowle is Associate Professor of Political Science at the United States Air Force Academy. His research focuses on Iraq, trans-Atlantic relations, and foreign policy decision making. He served in the Strategy, Plans, and Assessment Division in the Headquarters of the Multinational Force-Iraq, Baghdad, from August to December 2004.
By summer 2004, it was clear that the war in Iraq was not going to be over quickly. What westerners call the insurgency was not merely 'dead-enders,' bent on restoring the old regime, but a complex mix of Ba'athists, Sunni fundamentalists, Shi'a rejectionists, foreign infiltrators, and patriotic Iraqi nationalists who resented the occupation. The war also faced growing public discontent within all the coalition countries themselves. Finally, it faced poor coordination and communication among the American agencies responsible for Iraq's transition from an occupied country to one with a constitutional government. The war was directed from Washington and executed by troops on the ground throughout Iraq; between those levels was the Green Zone, home to the U.S. embassy and the agencies established to oversee a transition to Iraqi rule. Hope is Not a Plan takes the reader inside the Green Zone. It looks at an aspect of the war not previously examined. This is not the story as seen from Washington, not that of the soldier on the ground. It looks at the process of turning political and military goals into action. It focuses on the critical months of late 2004 and early 2005 when a new sovereign government in Iraq tried to build its legitimacy and the coalition force tried to find the best way to help it do so. In doing so, it helps explain how Iraq got to where it is today. The book is organised by topic rather than on a strict chronological basis. It is practical, not theoretical, referring to lessons learned. The book describes what happened in the Green Zone during this period, and it contrasts that reality with what history, experience, and military doctrine suggests should have happened, describing the impact of these mistakes. Finally, it reflects on what we can learn from this experience so that it is not repeated.
Author Biography:
Thomas Mowle is Associate Professor of Political Science at the United States Air Force Academy. His research focuses on Iraq, trans-Atlantic relations, and foreign policy decision making. He served in the Strategy, Plans, and Assessment Division in the Headquarters of the Multinational Force-Iraq, Baghdad, from August to December 2004.
| Autor | Mowle, Thomas |
|---|---|
| Ilmumisaeg | 2007 |
| Kirjastus | Abc-Clio |
| Köide | Kõvakaaneline |
| Bestseller | Ei |
| Lehekülgede arv | 224 |
| Pikkus | 235 |
| Laius | 235 |
| Keel | American English |
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