Architecture Of Democracy, The: Constitutional Design, Conflict

Description:
Reynolds brings together the leading scholars to discuss the successes and failures of constitutional design. Arend Lijphart and Donald Horowitz debate their own contributions to the field. Emerging scholars then present important new evidence from Europe, the CIS, Latin America, and Africa. Chapters analyse the effect of presidential and parliamentary systems, issues of federalism and autonomy, and the varying impact of electoral systems. The book concludes with case studies of Fiji, Ireland, Eritrea, Indonesia, Nigeria, and India. The Architecture of Democracy is the culmination of the study of constitutional engineering in the third wave of democracy and sets parameters for this crucial research as democracy diffuses across the world.

Review:
Andrew Reynolds has succeeded in doing what too many editors of post-convention edited volumes fail to do: composing an impressive book that is smart in structure and contains a series of very strong chapters. Journal of Peace Research These essays provide a sample and overview of the current state of debate linking institutional design to democratic durability. Democratization

Table of Contents:
PART I: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES: AN OVERVIEW; Introduction Institutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy in Divided Societies; 1. 1. Constitutional Design and the Problem of adoption: Proposals versus Processes; 2. The Wave of Power Sharing Democracy; 3. Institutions and Coalition-Building in Post-Communist Transitions; PART II: PRESIDENTIALISM, FEDERALISM AND DECENTRALIZATION, AND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS; 4. Presidents, Parliaments and Democracy: Insights from the Post-Communist World; 5. Presidentialism and Democratic Performance; 6. Constitutional asymmetries: Communal Representation, Federalism, and Cultural Autonomy; 7. Federalism and State-Building: Post-Communist and Post-Colonial Perspectives; 8. Ballots not Bullets: Testing Consociational Theories of Ethnic Conflict, Electoral Systems and Democratization; 9. Designing Electoral Rules and Waiting for an Electoral System to Evolve; PART III: COUNTRY STUDIES; 10. 10. Constitutional Engineering in Fiji; 11. The British-Irish Agreement of 1998: Results and Prospects; 12. The Eritrean Experience in Constitution Making: The Dialectic of Process and Substance; 13. Indonesia's Democratic Transition: Playing By the Rules; 14. Institutional Design, Ethnic Conflict Management, and Democracy in Nigeria; 15. India