Wittgenstein: Meaning And Judgement

Description:
In this important study, Michael Luntley offers a compelling reading of Wittgenstein's account of meaning and intentionality, based upon a unifying theme in the early and later philosophies. Rejecting readings which see a complete break between the Philosophical Investigations and the Tractatus, as well as views of Wittgenstein's mature work which either lament or champion his anti-philosophical 'quietism', Luntley argues that Wittgenstein's abiding concern was to show that the conditions for the possibility of intentionality consist not in a body of theoretical knowledge, but in perceptual knowledge, in our active capacity to 'see things aright'.

Review:
"The largely moribund state of current Wittgenstein scholarship ought to be radically changed for the better by this conspicuously interesting and insightful book." Alan Thomas, Philosophical Books "Michael Luntley offers a striking interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy, one aimed at displaying and defending Wittgenstein's positive contribution in the later work. The result is a theory of the conditions for the possibility of intentionality, a theory that identifies the subject as agent in the world with that condition. Powerfully argued, this interesting and original treatment of Wittgenstein's later philosophy raises a challenge for all of us who find a social dimension in Wittgenstein's account of intentionality and normativity." Meredith Williams, The Johns Hopkins University "Luntley provides an intriguing discussion of Wittgenstein's early work, arbitrating judiciously between realist readings that emphasise the place of reference in its account of language, and non-realist readings that emphasise inference." Daniel Whiting, University of Reading, Philosophical Investigations 28/4, October 2005

Table of Contents:
PrefaceAbbreviations1. Wittgenstein's Master ArgumentIntroductionAnimating SignsThe Platonist Source Of GrammarThe Cartesian Source Of GrammarThe Community Source Of GrammarThe Negative And Positive Phases - First Statement2. Realism, Language And SelfIntroductionLogic Takes Care Of ItselfThe Need For GrammarThe Metaphysical OptionsThe Self3. This Is How We Play The GameIntroductionTwo Kinds Of HiddenMeaning And UseUse And SelfUse And Augustine's MistakeIs 'Slab!' A Shortening Of 'Bring Me A Slab!' Or Is The Latter A Lengthening Of The Former?This And Similar Things Are Called 'Games'Spontaneity In Particular Circumstances4. Rules And Other PeopleIntroductionThe Structure Of An ArgumentThe Bipartite Account Of MeaningPracticeWhat You See/Hear Is Not NormlessSeeing The Similarity In Particular Cases5. Putting Your Self In The PictureIntroductionThe Standard TreatmentsWhat's Special About Sensations?The Need For CalibrationCalibration In SubjectivityAgreement In Forms Of Life'Inner' Life Out ThereNow I Understand6. Seeing Things Aright:IntroductionTwo Uses Of The Word 'See'See What I MeanPaying AttentionThe Place Of JudgementWhat Comes NaturalBibliographyIndex